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Copyright law faces a fundamental problem, the likes of which may be
seen in many facets of the human experience. It is a problem so ancient that
the Roman poet Juvenal addressed it in his Satires with the simple question:
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?l A more modem observer might phrase the
problem a little differently: How does society protect the interests of the ma-
jority from the interests of the minority when the minority is able to make the
rules? In the case of copyright law, a powerful and vocal minority has stead-
ily been advancing its own interests for centuries without formidable opposi-
tion. As we move through the digital age, acquiring new technology that will
allow us to create and share to an unprecedented degree, it is important that
we reevaluate the proper role of copyright in an information-based society,
so that the interests of all are best served by the law.
The history of American copyright law dates back to the formation of
the United States. Thomas Jefferson, widely known for his opinion of copy-
right as a "necessary evil," sought to limit its term and privileges accordingly
during the Constitutional Convention.2 Jefferson's viewpoint was captured
accurately in the simple language of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
Standing as the building block for all subsequent statutes, policies and rul-
ings, the Copyright Clause grants Congress the power to "promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."3
In Jefferson's time, copyright law was predominantly concerned with
the rights of authors and book publishers.4 Facing a widespread system of
counterfeit publishing rings, the Framers feared that without copyright, au-
thors and publishers would not obtain compensation adequate to incentivize
* Brady Frazier is a J.D. Candidate at Southern Methodist University, Class of
2012. He would like to thank Brandon Darden and Thuy Nguyen for their
invaluable help in editing, and his family and friends for their continual
support.
1. "Who will guard the guards?" This quote is often incorrectly attributed to
Plato's The Republic. See Spartacus, The Men's Tribute (Byzantine Empire),
translated in INTERNET ANCIENT HISTORY SOURCEBOOK, Juvenal, Satire VI
(Jan. 1999), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/juvenal-
satvi.html.
2. Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004,
available at http://www.robertboynton.com/articleDisplay.php?article-id=5.
3. Id.
4. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX, 5 (2008).
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them to continue their work.5 In contrast, the onset of the digital age has
opened up the floodgates for both the production and consumption of copy-
righted material to the layperson, requiring only access to a computer.6 As a
result, modern copyright law concerns itself with a myriad of mediums of
tangible expression, including songs, films, speeches, slogans, and software.7
Unfortunately, rather than evolve in accordance with the technological devel-
opments of the digital era, copyright law has devolved to the point of peril-
ous stagnation.S
Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, media conglomer-
ates have been increasingly fervent in their efforts to quash the "piracy" of
their intellectual property by consumers. 9 Powerful lobbies have pushed
multiple bills through Congress, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act and the Copyright Term Extension Act, which heavily favor entrenched
media and publishing corporations at the expense of the creative general pub-
lic.'O In addition, as exemplified by recent practices of the Recording Indus-
try Association of America (RIAA), Big Media"] has attempted to enforce
their overbearing laws by arbitrarily suing individual "pirates" for vast
amounts of money and unilaterally shutting down software providers through
"temporary" injunctions.12
With the advent of new software tools and an increased awareness of
the realities of copyright law today, there is a growing movement, known as
the Copy Left, which favors broad changes that would reshape copyright law,
improve the dissemination of information and better protect First Amend-
ment free speech rights.13 Although recent experiments in copyright protec-
tion designed for the digital age, such as the Creative Commons, have been
5. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 282
(1970).
6. NETANEL, supra note 4, at 8.
7. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
8. See Breyer, supra note 5, at 9.
9. NETANEL, supra note 4, at 8.
10. NETANEL, supra note 4, at 8.
11. By "Big Media," I am referring generally to large corporations whose revenue
streams are highly dependent on copyrighted material. More specifically, I am
referring to the "Big Six": General Electric, The Wait Disney Company, News
Corp., TimeWarner, Viacom, and CBS. These media conglomerates represent
a substantial fraction of revenue in the film, television, radio, and print indus-
tries . See, e.g., Ownership Chart: The Big Six, FREEPRESS, available at http://
www.freepress.net/ownership/chartl/main (last visited June 2, 2011).
12. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1404
(2004).
13. Boynton, supra note 2.
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met with substantial success and scholarly praise, media conglomerates ap-
pear reluctant to yield any ground in this intellectual property battle.14 De-
spite this resistance to change, there are important economic, constitutional,
and moral arguments surrounding copyright policies, particularly with the
regards to the term of copyright protection, which must be considered if cop-
yright law is to continue to remain a fair and viable system.
II. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Origin of Copyright
Though copyright law is currently a subject of much debate and activ-
ism, until recently, commentators generally thought of copyright as a bland
and predictable area of law. 15 However, when the notion of copyright and
freedom from oppressive copyright first manifested itself during the Renais-
sance, violence and passion surrounded it.16
Access to the written word, and literacy in general, became more com-
monplace in the Western World as the revolution of the printing press
slowly, but inevitably, spread across Europe.17 Unfortunately, because the
Church and many European governments opposed the publishing of opinions
they considered dangerous, an attempt was made to suppress dissenters by
exerting precise control over what was permissible for publication.18 Estab-
lishing close ties to booksellers and granting them a perpetual monopoly on
the right to publish approved books accomplished such censorship.19 It was
not until John Milton published his eloquent and ultimately influential Aer-
opagitica that the notion of freedom of speech and freedom of the press be-
gan to seep into the public consciousness.20 Milton, who published his essay
in direct violation of the Licensing Order of 1643, argued that Parliament had
no right to censor English citizens.21 He believed the search for truth de-
manded the freedom to consider both sides of an issue, famously stating,
14. See Boynton, supra note 2.
15. Boynton, supra note 2.
16. Etienne Dolet, a French publisher, died by being burnt at the stake in 1546 for
violating early French copyright law. CHISHOLM, HUGH, ED., ENCYCLOPWEDIA
BRITANNICA (11th ed. 1911) available at http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/168169/Etienne-Dolet.
17. E.g., K. Fogel, The Surprising History of Copyright and the Promise of a Post-
Copyright World, QUESTIONCOPYRIGHT.ORG, available at http://questioncopy-
right.org/promise (last visited June 2, 2011).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Sid Parkinson, The Aeropagitica: John Milton, ST. LAWRENCE INSTITUTE FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, available at http://www.stlawrenceinstitute.
org/vol14mit.html (last visited June 2, 2011).
21. Id.
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"Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to con-
science, above all other liberties."22
In 1709, Parliament acted on the growing popularity of Milton's ideas
for freedom of expression and simultaneously ceded to the authors' demands
for a more substantial property right in their work by passing the Statute of
Anne.23 Which declared by its full title to be "An Act for the Encouragement
of Learning," and was subsequently the world's first set of codified copyright
laws?24 The Statute blazed the trail for the next two centuries of copyright by
abolishing the older system of bookseller censorship and granting a fourteen-
year term of legal protection to authors.25 Perhaps most importantly, it also
ended the system of booksellers' perpetual ownership of literature by creat-
ing the world's first public domain.26
"History, as we know, is apt to repeat itself."27 Viewed through the
clarity of a historical lens, today's fierce copyright battles are simply the
newest theater of a war consuming two continents and nearly three centuries.
In the decades following the promulgation of the Statute of Anne, copyright
owners' rights inevitably began to expire.28 The booksellers29 fought the
ending of copyright protection with a series of protracted lawsuits, attempt-
ing to assert that the Statute of Anne only supplemented preexisting common
law rights that acted to prolong the copyright term indefinitely.30 The book-
sellers faced strenuous opposition from the public however, as is shown by
the text of a popular pamphlet written in 1735, which stated the case in time-
less terms:
22. John Milton, Aeropagitica; A Speech of Mr. John Milton, DARTMOUTH, availa-
ble at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-milton/reading-room/areopagitica/ (last vis-
ited June 2, 2011).
23. Fogel, supra note 17.
24. Fogel, supra note 17.
25. If the author was alive at the end of the fourteen-year term, he was granted an
additional fourteen years of copyright protection. Books published prior to the
Statute of Anne were granted a single twenty-one year term beginning in 1710.
See Fogel, supra note 17.
26. JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW: THE LAW OF THE INTERNET, 34 (1997).
27. GEORGE ELIOT, SCENES OF CLERICAL LIFE, 186 (1858).
28. See, e.g., Thom Holwerda, Copyright Turns 300 Today, OS NEWS (Apr. 10,
2010, 11:19 P.M.), available at http://www.osnews.com/story/23138/Copy-
rightTums_300_Today.
29. The booksellers purported to sue in the name of authors' rights, although ac-
cording to law professor Raymond Patterson, "The publishers ... had as much
concern for authors as a cattle rancher has for cattle." LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY, 90 (2005).
30. Id.
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I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will
not hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
ones Expire... it will in Effect be establishing a perpetual Mo-
nopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the Eye of the Law; it will
be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to Learning, no
Benefit to Authors, but a general Tax on the Public; and all this
only to increase the private Gain of Booksellers.31
Through multiple rulings spanning over two decades, culminating in
Donaldson v. Beckett, the courts ultimately established that the Lords had
intended to completely replace the old common law rule by explicitly creat-
ing a fourteen- year term of protection.32 These decisions ushered in a new
era of shared literacy for the English, where prices fell dramatically and pub-
lishers made the classics readily available to the people. 33 The dominion of
the public domain had begun, but its vitality would soon prove to be short-
lived.
B. Copyright Law in the New World
In the midst of the copyright revolution taking place in England, the
young and largely agrarian American colonies were content to leave the for-
mulation of copyright law as a low priority.34 However, although the Statute
of Anne did not apply in English colonies, it proved to be highly influential,
as it was in keeping with the colonists' anti-monopoly tendencies.35 Prior to
1783, three states passed copyright laws with the term ranging from five to
seven years. 36 During this time, several authors petitioned the Continental
Congress to pass a more uniform law to protect their interests.37 The Conti-
nental Congress agreed with the idea in spirit, but under the Articles of Con-
federation it did not have the power to issue copyrights.38 Instead, the
Continental Congress passed a resolution urging the states "to secure to the
authors or publishers of any new books ... the copyright of such books for a
31. MATTHEw RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION:
HANDS OFF MY IPoD, 27 (2007).
32. LEE MARSHALL, BOOTLEGGING: ROMANTICISM AND COPYRIGHT IN THE MUSIC
INDUSTRY, 15 (2006).
33. Id.
34. PATRICK J. WELCH & GERRY F. WELCH, Economics: Theory and Practice, 52
(2010).
35. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the
Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. Copy. SocY. 675 (2002).
36. PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPY-
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certain time not less than fourteen years from the first publication."39 Within
three years, all of the states, except Delaware, passed copyright statutes, with
the majority following the lead of the Statute of Anne, by granting two four-
teen-year terms. 40
As written in the Constitution, the Copyright Clause was intended to
serve a very different and much more limited purpose than today's copyright
law. In submitting their proposal for the Copyright Clause to the Constitu-
tional Convention, James Madison and Charles Pinckney endured great pains
to ensure that the scope of copyright was well defined.41 While the stated
goal of copyright law shifted during the centuries preceding the Constitution,
at its inception, American copyright law was intended to act merely as a
conflict resolution mechanism.42 The Framers desired copyright protection
to balance the need to keep book revenues high enough to secure adequate
production, while maintaining book prices low enough to ensure widespread
dissemination of written materials.43 Furthermore, the wording of the Copy-
right Clause in the Constitution, though simple, evokes an understanding that
in order to "promote the progress of science and useful arts," the ending of
copyright protection was just as important as the protection itself.44 Thomas
Jefferson intended copyright protection to provide just enough incentive to
create and nothing more.45 He believed that an individual's idea was his
exclusive possession, as long as he kept it quiet, but "the moment it is di-
vulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone."46
This principle of the public domain was important to the first Congress,
and was reflected in the passage of the Copyright Act of 1790. Closely mir-
roring the Statute of Anne, it granted protection for a term of fourteen years
from the time of creation, with the right to renew for an additional fourteen
years. 47 In the spirit of America's status as a young and rebellious nation, the
Act granted protection only to authors of American citizenship, thus robbing
their British counterparts of substantial profits and allowing cheap access to a
multitude of popular literature from overseas.4 8 One notable difference be-
tween the Copyright Act of 1790 and our current conception of copyright law
39. Id.
40. Id. at 143.
41. Yu, supra note 37, at 143.
42. Breyer, supra note 5, at 282.
43. Breyer, supra note 5, at 282.
44. Breyer, supra note 5, at 282; Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
45. Boynton, supra note 2.
46. Boynton, supra note 2.
47. Yu, supra note 3736, at 143.
48. See Robert Nagle, Charles Dickens Protests U.S. Copyright Law, TELEREAD
(Sep. 6, 2007, 5:57 P.M.), available at http://www.teleread.com/copy-right/
charles-dickens-protests-us-copyright-law/.
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is that the renewal right was originally vested in the author alone and could
not be conveyed.49 This concept of limited renewal reflected the Congres-
sional Congress' view that authors should receive the benefit of their work if,
and only if, they would personally benefit.50 Unfortunately, modern copy-
right law has strayed far from this guiding principle.
Congress amended the copyright term for the first time by passing the
Copyright Act of 1831, which Senator Daniel Webster pushed through Con-
gress on behalf of his equally famous cousin, Noah Webster. 5' Best known
for his contribution to American education and the dictionary, Noah was also
a prolific author, who stood to gain substantially from the extra copyright
protection.52 This amendment changed the first term of protection from four-
teen to twenty-eight years, while leaving the term for the option to renew
untouched at fourteen years. 53 Apparently, there was very little debate over
the passage of this bill, no doubt due in large part to the fame and prestige
held by both Websters.54 The Copyright Act of 1909 changed the law yet
again, and with equally little fuss, by lengthening the term of the renewal
period to 28 years, matching the length of the initial term. 55
During this time, there was heavy pressure on the United States to be-
come a signatory to the Berne Convention, an international copyright treaty
established in 1886, which was already joined by many developed nations.56
However, Congress was unwilling to sign the treaty for many years because
of the wide chasm in policy goals and requirements between the American
copyright system and the Berne Convention.57 The Berne Convention was
unprecedented in the depth and breadth of its copyright regulations.58 At the
insistence of famous authors, such as Victor Hugo, the Convention was es-
tablished for the purpose of establishing worldwide recognition of foreign
49. Yu, supra note 3736, at 143.
50. Yu, supra note 3736, at 143.
51. E.g., An Exhibit Commemorating the 250th Anniversary of Noah Webster's
Birth, AMHERST, available at https://www.amherst.edu/library/archives/exhibi-
tions/webster (last checked May 31, 2011).
52. Id.
53. WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:23 (2009).
54. Joseph Gales & Winston Williams Seaton, Register of Debates in Congress,
422-24 (Jan. 7, 1831), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/
kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/%22us_ 831 a%22.
55. The 1909 Copyright Act (As Amended), available at http://law.copyrightdata.
com/index.php (last visited June 2, 2011).
56. See, e.g., International Copyright-The United States And The Berne Conven-
tion, available at http://law.jrank.org/pages/5739/Copyright-Intemational-
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copyrights for the first time.59 It was developed out of the French concept of
''right of the author," which stood in stark contrast to the role of copyright
favored by the English and American systems as a purely economic solu-
tion.60 The Convention heavily emphasized the moral component of copy-
right protection and mandated that the term of protection last at least fifty
years after the life of the author.61 Furthermore, it required that copyright be
granted automatically as opposed to requiring registration with a governing
body.62
On the other hand, the American copyright system was based on the
idea that an author could reap the benefits of his work only during his life-
time, after which the work should disseminate into the public domain.63 Fur-
thermore, U.S. copyright required that an author affirmatively state his intent
to claim the copyright for his work at the time of publication through regis-
tration as opposed to receiving automatic protection for all work, published
or unpublished.64 Rather than sacrifice its ideals, Congress instead chose to
ratify the Universal Copyright Convention in 1954 and again in 1971.65 Al-
though not as widespread as the Berne Convention, this treaty allowed the
U.S. to keep its current copyright system unchanged, while allowing some
limited international cooperation.66
C. The New Age of Copyright Law
When Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, it effectuated a com-
plete revision of the policy goals and scope of copyright in the United States
and laid the foundation for our current laws.67 Under the new Act, the copy-
right term was measured by the life of the author plus fifty years, or seventy-
five years for works of unknown authorship.68 Moreover, it granted an auto-
matic copyright to works falling under the Act, rather than requiring artists to
59. Patrick Ross, How Long Is Enough? Copyright Term Extensions and the Berne
Convention, THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUNDATION (June 15, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop13.15copyright-term-lengths.
pdf.
60. Michael Knes, Berne Convention, available at http://www.referenceforbusi-




63. International Copyright, supra note 57.
64. International Copyright, supra note 57.
65. International Copyright (2009), available at http://www.copyight.gov/fls/
fllOO.html (last visited June 2, 2011).
66. Id.
67. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998).
68. Id.
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register their works with the Copyright Office.69 Congress, having formed a
committee decades earlier to study the problem, claimed to have taken into
account the enormous advances achieved in media since the last major up-
date in 1909.70 Curiously, this major shift in American intellectual property
law almost went unnoticed at the time. Only, one news article appeared in
the New York Times, and the vast majority of scholarly discussion appeared
solely in publishers' and librarians' journals.7'
The Copyright Act of 1976 codified what had essentially been the com-
mon law doctrine up until that point by clearly stating the five exclusive
rights of copyright owners: the right to reproduce, create derivative works,
sell or lease, perform, and display.72 Furthermore, for the first time, the Act
codified the fair use defense to copyright infringement, the exception to the
exclusive right granted by copyright law, whereby copyrighted material may
be used without infringing the author's rights.73 Congress embodied fair use
in four governing considerations: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion of the original work used, and (4) the effect of the use upon the
market.74 By clearly stating the new components of copyright doctrine, Con-
gress hoped to streamline this field of law, while benefitting authors and
creators over that of publishers.V5
However, it was no mere accident that the Copyright Act of 1976 met
the minimum standards enabling the U.S. to become a signatory member of
the Berne Convention.76 Since the turn of the century, the U.S. had evolved
from a nation of copyright pirates to the home of the most valuable copy-
rights in the world.77 Only by accepting the Berne Convention could Ameri-
can copyrights be assured international protection.78 Thus, with powerful
lobbies backed by media conglomerates demanding legislative action, Con-
gress finally yielded and passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1988.79 After over a century of defiance in the face of international pres-
69. Id.




72. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2010).
73. Id. at § 107.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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sure, the U.S. finally "updated" its copyright law to a standard written two
years before the first silent movie was made.80
III. CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Battle Over Copyright Duration
For copyright owners in the U.S., the battle was not yet won. Media
conglomerates began pushing for an even longer term of protection, as a
large number of their copyrights threatened to enter the public domain.81
Leading the charge was the Walt Disney Company, who invested heavily in
the lobbying effort to get new legislation passed.82 Disney, desiring to pro-
tect its iconic early work for as long as possible, knew it would be well worth
the cost if its efforts succeeded. 83 Representative Sonny Bono, whose past
musical success had left him with numerous-valuable copyrights in his pos-
session, was the most notable of the twelve sponsors of the bill.84 Bono,
reportedly a proponent of an infinite copyright term, zealously promoted a
House bill that would authorize a mere twenty-year increase to the term of
copyright protection.85 Sadly, Bono died shortly before the passing of an
alternate bill, the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998, which was
named the Sonny Bono Act in his honor.86
Some of the largest corporations in the U.S. endorsed the CTEA, which
was no surprise considering the staggering amount of potential licensing fees
at issue.87 Proponents of the CTEA also cited many benefits of extending
copyright protection aside from the obvious self-interest. Lobbyists argued
that copyright duration should be lengthened because general lifespan expec-
80. Id.
81. See PATRY, supra note 54.
82. Chris Sprigman, The Mouse That Ate the Public Domain: Disney, The Copy-
right Term Extension Act, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, FINDLAw (Mar. 5, 2002),
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305-sprigman.
html.
83. The original copyrights for Mickey Mouse and many other Disney characters
were set to expire in the early 2000s. Indeed, some critics have noted "copy-
right law has become equal to the life of Mickey Mouse." See, e.g., Mike
Masnick, Copyright Length And The Life Of Mickey Mouse, TECHDIRT (Aug.
11, 2009), available at http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090811/01231058
35.shtml.
84. Sprigman, supra note 82.
85. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 256 (2003).
86. Sprigman, supra note 82.
87. Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths
Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
253, 280 (2002).
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tancy had increased significantly since the original Copyright Act of 1790.88
Additionally, they argued that U.S. copyright should keep pace with Euro-
pean copyright, which had recently increased to a seventy-year term in many
countries.89 Furthermore, lobbyists claimed there was a certain class of long-
term, large investment works that would only be incentivized by a seventy-
year copyright term.90
Proponents of the CTEA rejected the idea that Congress did not have
the constitutional authority to lengthen copyright law, claiming the language
of the Copyright Clause did not create a substantive limitation; instead, it
merely required that the copyright term last for some finite term. 91 Likewise,
they rejected the idea that lengthening the copyright term would infringe the
value of the public domain, since for the first time the CTEA would allow
unpublished works to go into the public domain.92 In addition, proponents of
the CTEA cited specific instances in which society was better served by
keeping a work out of the public domain. Such an example is when the film
It's a Wonderful Life repeatedly aired in various low quality versions until
the copyright was enforced and a higher quality version was produced to
much critical acclaim.93
However, unlike past copyright bills, vigorous opposition appeared dur-
ing the buildup to the CTEA.94 Under law professor Dennis S. Karjala's
leadership, this opposing movement spoke out against the CTEA, and for the
first time attempted to educate the populace on the impact of copyright law.95
The opponents castigated the CTEA as a blatant act of corporate welfare,
demonstrating Congress's tendency to be swayed by powerful lobbying
groups. 96 In contrast to Representative Bono's claims, the opponents claimed
the CTEA was unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. They argued the
CTEA introduced the possibility of increasing the copyright term without
limit, thereby preventing works from entering the public domain, an action
clearly contrary to the intention of the Copyright Clause.97 Additionally,
they argued that because it was not "necessary and proper" legislation to
88. Id. at 288.
89. Id. at 290-91.
90. Id. at 296-97.
91. Id. at 297-98.
92. Martin, supra note 88, at 321.
93. Martin, supra note 88, at 273.
94. See Dennis S. Karjala, Opposing Copyright Legislation, OPPOSING COPYRIGHT
EXTENSION, 1 (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/
-dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1998statement.html.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 20-21.
97. Id. at 8.
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accomplish the Copyright Clause's stated purpose, the CTEA was outside the
bounds of Congressional authority.98
Opponents of the CTEA also contended that few copyright holders
benefitted substantially from copyright ownership after the first years follow-
ing creation.99 Thus, the only copyright holders with an economic incentive
to extend copyright protection, and summarily benefit substantially are large
corporate entities with a collection of highly successful past creations, such
as Disney.100 The opponents countered the proponents' suggestion that new
works needed a longer term in order to incentivize their creation by noting
that the patent term of twenty years remained unchanged, but still afforded
enough protection for inventors to incentivize an enormous amount of crea-
tive energy in the U.S. patent field.O1 Moreover, they argued that while life
expectancy had risen to almost double that of 1790, the copyright term had
more than tripled already.102 Further, rather than incentivize new creation, a
longer copyright term would actually discourage new work in the arts and
sciences by limiting material available in the public domain.103 Additionally,
this problem would be compounded by requiring an artist to track down the
owner of a copyright, who might be over a century old or risk being sued.104
Members of organizations, such as the National Restaurant Association
and the National Licensed Beverage Association in particular, were appre-
hensive about the passage of the CTEA, since it would lengthen the duration
of the stringent licensing standards dealing with playing copyrighted music
in their establishments.105 In writing the initial draft of the CTEA, estab-
lished music licensing groups, such as the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) claimed
they were owed the requisite licensing fee every time one of their songs was
played in public, in light of the benefits establishments received.106 At the
time, it was common practice for ASCAP and BMI to send agents into the
field actively looking for infringing parties to sue as a source of income.107
In spite of the fierce opposition by the two copyright powerhouses however,
the House ultimately amended the CTEA to include the Fairness in Music
98. Id. at 10.
99. Karjala, supra note 95, at 23.
100. Karjala, supra note 95, at 23.
101. Karjala, supra note 95, at 10.
102. Karjala, supra note 95, at 24-25.
103. Karjala, supra note 95, at 12.
104. Karjala, supra note 95, at 12-13.
105. PATRY, supra note 54.
106. PATRY, supra note 54.
107. PATRY, supra note 54.
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Licensing Act of 1998, which exempted the need for licensing fees in certain
types of establishments, forever dooming jukeboxes to obscurity. 08
Strangely, aside from the vigorous opposition led by Karjala, the length
of the new term of protection prescribed by the CTEA was never debated in
the House or the Senate.109 In fact, the increase was only brought up by
Representative Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, who noted that it would provide
"a very generous windfall to the entertainment industry by extending the
term of copyright for an additional twenty years.""0 Ultimately, both the
House and the Senate passed the CTEA with a voice vote, implying that
there was very little opposition to the bill."'
According to Congress, it passed the CTEA for two main reasons." 2
First, U.S. copyright must be extended because it is "one of our most signifi-
cant trade surpluses.", 13 Second, Congress felt it had to balance out the U.S.
copyright term with that of its European counterparts." 14 Representative
Coble also noted that consumers would benefit by the extended term, since
copyrighted works tend to "attract investors who can exploit the work for
profit."' 15
However, the battle over the CTEA had not yet run its course. With the
promulgation of the CTEA, copyright protection for works published prior to
1978 retroactively increased by twenty years, totaling ninety-five years from
their date of publication.16 This left internet entrepreneurs, such as Eric El-
dred, whose livelihood depended on the public domain usage of formerly
copyrighted material, without recourse other than exorbitant licensing fees. 117
108. See id. Ironically, while Representative Bono did not support this amendment
to the CTEA, he had been spurred into politics in the 1980s by the legal pitfalls
he ran into while trying to start a restaurant. Sonny Bono-Biography, YAHOO!
MovIEs available at http://movies.yahoo.com/movie/contributor/1800057596/
bio (last visited June 2, 2011).
109. Dennis S. Karjala, Legislative History of CTEA (Summary Outline)), OPPOSING
COPYRIGHT EXTENSION (May 31, 2002), available at http://homepages.law.asu.
edu/-dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtensionlegmats/CTEALegislati veHistory
Outline.html.
110. Id.; Dennis Harney, Mickey Mousing the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution: Eldred v. Reno, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 291, 302 (2002).
111. Bill Summary & Status, 105th Congress (1997-1998)), S.505, All Congres-
sional Actions, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS available at http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:SN00505:@@@X (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
112. Karjala, supra note 110.
113. Karjala, supra note 110.
114. Karjala, supra note 110.
115. Karjala, supra note 110.
116. Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2010).
117. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
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Eldred's publishing business depended on certain works entering the public
domain in 1998.'18 Following the passage of the CTEA, however, those
works would now be withheld from the public domain until 2018.119 Joined
by both commercial and noncommercial parties, who relied on new public
domain material, Eldred filed suit against the government claiming the
CTEA was unconstitutional.120 Eldred's arguments claimed that: (1) Con-
gress had violated the "limited times" formulation of the Copyright Clause
by retroactively extending copyright terms, (2) any copyright law must be
subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment to ensure a proper balance
between free speech and copyright interests, and (3) the doctrine of public
trust requires the government to show public benefit when transferring public
property to private parties, even in the case of future public property.' 2'
The district court opinion, issued by Judge June Green in 1999, summa-
rily rejected all of Eldred's arguments, agreeing with the government's posi-
tion that Congress had the power to extend the terms as long as it wished,
provided the terms were of finite duration.122 The court found that in light of
its interpretation of Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
First Amendment scrutiny should not apply to copyright cases, and similarly,
that the concept of public trust was inapplicable to copyright.123
Eldred appealed the district court decision to the D.C. Circuit, dropping
his public trust argument in favor of strengthening his argument that retroac-
tively extending copyright terms does not "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts."' 124 Eldred argued that such "grandfather" laws do not serve
the quid pro quo formulation inherently required by intellectual property
rights.125 Once again, the court rejected Eldred's arguments.126 However, a
strongly worded dissenting opinion by Judge David Sentelle agreed with El-
dred that the CTEA was unconstitutional because it violated the "limited
times" requirement of the Copyright Clause.127 Judge Sentelle wrote that
Supreme Court precedent requires a defined outer limit to congressional





122. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 186-187.
125. Id. at 187.
126. Id.
127. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198.
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could continue to retroactively extend the copyright term for past works
without limit.128
Eldred filed a final appeal to the Supreme Court, which heard his case in
2002.129 In light of Judge Sentelle's dissent and several recent Supreme
Court opinions, Eldred reshaped his argument, emphasizing that the Court
had held past statutes unconstitutional for exceeding the limits of Congres-
sional power, and since the wording of the Copyright Clause was expressly
limited, it was no exception.130
However, the Court disagreed with Eldred's premise and ruled 7-2 that
the CTEA was constitutional.131 In the opinion written by Justice Ginsberg,
the Court found that there was precedent for allowing the retroactive exten-
sion of copyright duration based on the Copyright Acts of 1790, 1831, 1909,
and 1976.132 The Court held that while the Constitution expressly required
copyright duration be for a limited time, as long as that limit was not "for-
ever," then any limit approved by Congress was constitutional.133 The Court
also took into account that both the Copyright Act of 1976 and the CTEA
had been passed with the intention of matching existing copyright law in
Europe to avoid losing substantial royalties for American companies.134 The
Court refused to contemplate Eldred's argument that copyright law must be
balanced with First Amendment free speech standards.135
Justice Breyer, a well-known copyright professor and scholar before his
career as a jurist, wrote a powerful dissenting opinion.136 He examined the
historical record and showed that from the beginning, copyright had been
intended to serve the public interest rather than private.137 Breyer argued the
CTEA effectively created perpetual copyright protection, which severely un-
dermines the public interest.138 He pointed out that an artist is highly un-
likely to be more inclined to create a new work because he knows that his
grandchildren will receive royalties.139 Breyer rejected the government's
contention that royalties received by artists allow them to produce more
128. Id.
129. Id. at 186.
130. Id. at 189.
131. Id. at 198.
132. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 205-206.
135. Id. at 218-19.
136. Id. at 242.
137. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 247.
138. Id. at 243.
139. Id. at 255.
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work, asking, "How will extension help today's Noah Webster create new
works 50 years after his death?"40
B. Criminalizing Piracy with the DMCA
Created in 1967, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
is a specialized agency of the United Nations, whose task is "to encourage
creative activity, to promote the protection of intellectual property through-
out the world."'4 WIPO is largely self-funded through the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in fees that it collects every year through its global IP
application and registration systems.142 Since its establishment, WIPO fol-
lows its mandate by writing treaties relating to IP policy that member nations
can subsequently agree to sign.143 Unfortunately, WIPO has long been per-
ceived as another victim of the persisting problem of what some parties per-
ceive as undue influence within the UN, particularly as it relates to the
heavily criticized North-South divide.144 Because of this perception, the U.S.
and other developed countries avoided working with WIPO for many years
after its creation.1n5 However, after much debate, the U.S. bowed to interna-
tional pressure, choosing to sign and implement two new treaties written by
WIPO in 1996.146 Congress passed its method of enforcement in 1998 with
the promulgation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).147
140. Id.
141. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/convention/trtdocs-wo029.html (last visited June 2, 2011).
142. Proposed Program and Budget for 2006/07, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/
wo-pbc_8/wo-pbc_8_3_pub.pdf (last visited June 2, 2011).
143. WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZA-
TION, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ (last visited June 2, 2011).
144. Member states in the UN all receive one vote regardless of their real-world
influence or level of industrialization, which has led to sharply contrasting pol-
icy goals between the richer "Northern" states above the equator and the poorer
"Southern" states below. See Shravanti Reddy, Watchdog Organization Strug-




146. Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States:
Will Fair Use Survive?, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236 (1999).
147. Id.
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Congress intended the DMCA to serve as a solution to perceived ram-
pant copyright infringement, or "piracy," taking place on the Internet."4
8
More specifically, it established a series of new legal rules and associated
penalties that were unprecedented in the history of copyright.149 The DMCA
contained an "anti-circumvention rule," which criminalized the circumven-
tion or defeat of technological measures that limit unauthorized access to
copyrighted works, whether or not infringement of the copyright actually oc-
curs. 50 Also, it created an even broader "anti-trafficking rule," which pro-
hibits trafficking in and providing means to defeat such technological access-
control measures, including criminal penalties for a violation of the rule.'51
In addition, and more broadly still, the DMCA contained a second anti-traf-
ficking provision, prohibiting trafficking in technological measures that con-
trol the uses of copyrighted works.152
The DMCA heightened the penalties associated with copyright infringe-
ment on the Internet, while simultaneously including a "safe harbor" provi-
sion at the fervent behest of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) across the
country. 53 Intended to protect ISPs from charges of secondary copyright
infringement, the provision protects ISPs from suit if they immediately re-
move or block any content purported to be infringing.154 Although it argua-
bly succeeded in preempting costly litigation, this new "notice and
takedown" regime has not been bloodless. Copyright holders, who naturally
would prefer to have absolute veto power when it comes to online content,
have faced off in court against parties determined to defend their First
Amendment free speech rights in several high profile cases.
C. The Fight Against "Piracy"
With the widespread adoption of the Internet, particularly among col-
lege campuses, a new phenomenon called peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks
quickly rose in popularity. 5 5 These P2P networks allowed users with little
148. See, e.g., Chris Tew, Linking to Infringing Content is Probably Illegal in the
U.S., WEBTVWIRE (Dec. 9, 2006), available at http://www.webtvwire.coml
linking-to-infringing-content-is-probably-illegal-in-the-us/.




153. Copyright Infringement and Remedies, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010).
154. Id.
155. Antionette D. Bishop, Illegal P2P File Sharing on College Campuses-What's
the Solution?, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 516 (Campus P2P network
popularity was in part based on the fact that campus intranets allowed for very
high bandwidth, or download speeds, several years prior to widespread cable
intemet access.).
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expertise to share digital files rapidly with perfect reproducibility.156 How-
ever, copyright holders, emboldened by the powerful new weapons granted
by the DMCA, took the battle to service providers and users like never
before. The early 2000s saw a string of hundreds of lawsuits against individ-
ual file sharers, a phenomenon unheard of before the passing of the
DMCA.157 Organizations such as the RIAA issued dozens of suits at a time
against individuals, often times college-aged or younger, for millions of dol-
lars apiece.5S The RIAA's strategy was identical each time. It would order
the ISP to reveal the infringing subscriber's IP address. 59 Then it would
send a demand letter offering to settle the case for the statutory minimum of
$750 per infringed copyright.160 If the user failed to settle, the RIAA would
file suit against the user for up to $150,000 per infringed copyright.161 Al-
though few of the RIAA-"pirate" cases went to trial, those few resulted in
verdicts for the RIAA with surprisingly high damages. 62
However, as time passed and the legal fees climbed higher, the RIAA
realized that this enforcement method was losing money. 163 It was also los-
ing the respect of the public, who castigated the RIAA for arbitrarily slapping
alleged infringers with suits that they did not have the resources to defend for
behavior identical to that indulged in by millions every day.164 In late 2008,
the RIAA announced they would cease filing lawsuits against individuals and
156. Id.
157. Michelle Singer, Mom Fights Recording Industry: Lawsuit Alleges Illegal File
Sharing, CBS NEWS.COM (Dec. 27, 2005), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2005/12/27/earlyshow/leisure/music/main I 166218.shtml.
158. Id.; Nate Anderson, RIAA: "We Have No Choice" But to File More Named
Lawsuits, ARS TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/05/
riaa-we-have-no-choice-but-to-file-more-named-lawsuits.ars (last visited Mar.
29, 2012).
159. Tom Corelis, RIAA Refiles Suddenly-Dropped Piracy Case, DAILYTECH, (June
18, 2008), http://www.dailytech.com/RIAA+Refiles+SuddenlyDropped+
Piracy+Case+/articlel 121 .htm.
160. Id.; Jaikumar Vijayan, Q&A: Tenenbaum Says He Faces Bankruptcy After




162. Id.; U.S. Woman to Pay 1.92 Million Dollars in Music Piracy Case, PHYS.ORG
(June 19, 2009), http://www.physorg.com/news164601902.html.
163. Eric Bangeman, RIAA anti-P2P campaign a real money pit, according to testi-
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instead target the creators of file sharing programs such as P2P networks. 65
Most recently, the RIAA filed suit against LimeWire, a popular P2P network,
for vicarious copyright infringement. 66 LimeWire's defense followed the
line of reasoning of the famous VCR case, Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios,
Inc., in that it raised substantial non-infringing uses. 167 However, LimeWire
lost this suit in 2010 and eventually settled the next year. 68
Although criminal charges exist under the DMCA, it is still an ex-
tremely rare event with the RIAA has yet to bring them in court. However,
Adobe Systems, the multibillion dollar software company, was not so reluc-
tant when it decided to issue a complaint against Dmitry Sklyarov in 2001.169
Sklyarov was a Russian programmer employed by the Russian company
ElcomSoft, which created a software program enabling users to regain lost
passwords for their e-book files.170 Shortly after giving a presentation at a
trade show in Las Vegas, the FBI arrested Sklyarov and took him into federal
custody on suspicion of violating the DMCA provision prohibiting distribu-
tion of a product designed to circumvent copyright protection measures. 171
Sklyarov's was one of the first and most widely publicized criminal copy-
right infringement cases in the U.S., and as such it received widespread me-
dia attention. After considerable efforts by various groups on the Internet in
support of his release, Adobe finally dropped all charges against Sklyarov in
exchange for his testimony.172 Despite the outcome, this episode served to
165. Id.; The RIAA Has Stopped Filing Lawsuits... Only They Haven't Quite, and




166. See Arista Records v. Lime Group, 715 F.Supp.2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
167. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). In this
context, non-infringing uses means the sharing of uncopyrighted files. While
LimeWire admitted that a majority of the files shared by users were copy-
righted, it argued that a substantial fraction of the file sharing was not copy-
righted content. Id. at 516.
168. John Newton, LimeWire v RIAA, FAVSTOCKS.COM (May 22, 2011), http://
www.favstocks.com/limewire-v-riaa-2/2259433/.
169. Adobe FAQ: ElcomSoft legal backgroundLB, ADOBE.COM, http://www.adobe.
com/aboutadobe/pressroom/pressreleases/200108/elcomsoftqa.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2012).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. John Leyden, Case Against Dmitry Sklyarov Dropped: Russian Programmer
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show the public just how swiftly the DMCA's version of justice could be
implemented.
D. The Google Era
In many ways, Google represents the new digital era in which we find
ourselves. Its highly successful business model enabled it to boom from a
small startup to a multibillion dollar company with tens of thousands of em-
ployees in less than a decade. 173 Google's business model is dependent on
the idea that the vast majority of all information will one day exist on the
Internet.174 Its stated goal is to organize all the world's information, and by
organizing it, it will thus add value'75 This is no small feat, as the amount of
new information created every year is increasing exponentially. 176 However,
this same business model, driven primarily by Google's unprecedented In-
ternet search capabilities, has skirted the edge of copyright law and beyond-
at least according to copyright holders. Google's cases are illustrative, not
for their specific impact on the question of optimal copyright duration, but
rather for exploring the more fundamental idea that the nature of copyright
has changed with the onset of the digital age while the law has remained
stagnant or even regressed. Furthermore, the Google cases offer an enlight-
ening comparison as to how existing law is applied to large corporations
versus individual users.
Perfect 10, an adult men's magazine, filed suit against Google in 2004
for two counts of direct copyright infringement.177 The main issue at trial
was whether Google's creation and use of thumbnail images in its image
search feature qualified as copyright infringement.178 The district court ap-
plied the four-part fair use test and ruled that Google indeed infringed on
Perfect 10's copyright because its usage was commercial in nature and it
overlapped with a preexisting Perfect 10 market-selling thumbnail images
173. Google Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2010 Results and Manage-
ment Changes, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/eamings/2010/Q4_google-
earnings.html (last visited JuneMar. 28, 2012).
174. Keith Woolcock, Is Google In Danger of Being Shut Out of the Changing In-
ternet?, TIME MAGAZINE.COM (Feb. 1, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/
02/01/are-we-seeing-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-google/.
175. Id.; Google's Mission is to Organize the World's Information and Make it Uni-
versally Accessible and Useful, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/com-
pany/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
176. See, e.g., RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY Is NEAR 10 (2005). (This idea is
exemplified by Moore's Law, which posits that computing power doubles
every two years. Ray Kurzweil further argues that nearly human progress is
increasing exponentially rather than linearly, including information
production.).
177. Perfect 10 v. Google., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
178. Id.
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for use on cell phones. 179 Google appealed the case and the resulting injunc-
tion to the Ninth Circuit, arguing in part, that the thumbnails fell under the
fair use defense.180 The court agreed with Google, overturning the district
court by finding that the thumbnails were highly transformative, offering
much greater functionality than the original image.1Sl The court also ob-
served that Google's image search offered a highly valuable service to the
public, "which should not be jeopardized just because it might be used in a
way that could affect somebody's sales."182
More recently, in 2007, Viacom brought suit against YouTube, and vi-
cariously against its owner Google, for "brazen" and "massive" copyright
infringement by allowing users to upload thousands of videos of which
Viacom claimed ownership.183 Google argued that the "safe harbor" provi-
sion of the DMCA protected it from the charges of contributory and vicari-
ous infringement.184 In 2010, the court ruled in Google's favor, finding that
although the company had general knowledge that users had uploaded some
copyrighted material, it was unreasonable to expect it to know which clips
were infringing.185 The court found that requiring websites to police every
uploaded video "would contravene the structure and operation of the
DMCA." 86
At first blush, the Google cases seem to indicate a shift in copyright law
favoring fair use and less onerous restrictions. However, taken with the P2P
cases and continuing lawsuits against individuals for infringement at what
used to be the outer edge of copyright protection, the landscape of copyright
law reveals an ever-changing swamp of rulings and new laws that favor me-
dia conglomerates. Rather than address the confusion, Congress is currently
considering a bill that would extend copyright to fashion design. a move that
many legal commentators have warned against for years., 87 Furthermore, the
179. Id. at 843
180. Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com., 508 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2007).
181. Id. at 1165.
182. Id. at 1169. See also Anthony Falzone, The Two Faces of Perfect 10 v.Google,
THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (May 16, 2007), http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5409.
183. Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y 2010).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 529.
186. Id. at 523.
187. Mike Masnick, The Many Ways In Which Fashion Copyrights Will Harm The
Fashion Industry, TECHDIRT.COM (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.techdirt.conV
articles/ 20100823/02293810724.shtml (Experts fear that attempting to regulate
the fashion industry will unnecessarily complicate the creative process and in-
stigate expensive litigation, causing consumers to pay higher prices and driving
down profits.).
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executive branch has established a committee to consider how best to enforce
existing copyright law-a direction that clearly favors Big Media-rather
than examining its effectiveness with regard to the constitutional purpose of
copyright law.188 Clearly, the ship that is U.S. copyright law is rapidly
steaming ahead into unknown waters.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Flawed Concept of Copyright
Originally, copyright was designed simply to incentivize authors to
write. It represents one method of resolving the conflict between the need for
book revenues high enough to secure adequate production and book prices
low enough to encourage widespread dissemination of what is written.189
Created in an era when literacy was low and the availability of reading mate-
rial was scarce at best, copyright represented the government's effort to en-
courage the populace to educate themselves. The Framers understood, just as
we do today, that the level of education in a society can affect everything
from crime rates to gross domestic product and everything in between. Its
effects, whether positive or negative, may last for generations. Thus, copy-
right was a compromise.
In hindsight, copyright appears to have succeeded in spurring the pro-
duction of masterpieces and inspiring a more educated populace. However,
that does not mean that its continued efficacy should never be questioned.
Furthermore, as Justice (then professor) Breyer wrote in his influential arti-
cle, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, "although we should hesitate to abolish
copyright protection, we should equally hesitate to extend or strengthen
it."190 Justice Breyer argued vigorously that copyright has always been an
imperfect solution, and before we set about strengthening a wall of protection
around creative works, we should diligently test the bedrock upon which it is
built.
There are two basic arguments for copyright: moral (noneconomic)
rights, and the economic inducement to publication.191 Moral rights are con-
cerned with the idea that authors deserve some compensation for their hard
work. The former Register of Copyrights noted that the secondary purpose
of copyright is "to give authors the reward due to them for their contribution
188. Executive Order-Establishment of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Ad-
visory Committees, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/20 11/02/08/executive-order-establishment-intellectual-property-enforce-
ment-advisory (last visited May. 31, 2011).
189. Breyer, supra note 5, at 283.
190. Breyer, supra note 5, at 284.
191. Breyer, supra note 5, at 284.
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to society."192 However, it is common sense that this reward need not come
in the form of some property right in their creation. Indeed, many authors
and artists have contracted to assign their copyright in a work to an employer
automatically, yet they require no other incentive besides their salary to cre-
ate the work in the first place.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, in any organized and prospering
society, few workers will ever receive salaries that approach the total value
of what they produce.193 There is nothing immoral about this type of system,
since consumers benefit from lower prices and society benefits from overall
growth.194 Furthermore, outside the realm of copyright, it is quite uncommon
for a normal salaried or hourly worker to be paid for work completed long
before. Typically, an employee's paycheck reflects the most recent period of
labor, while future paychecks are based on future labor. Thus, to speak of
the "fruits of one's labor" should not automatically imply that the author
deserves more compensation than his persuasion cost. 195
The moral theory of copyright also encompasses the idea that creative
work is an author's property. However, intellectual property differs from
real property and chattel in several important respects. Normally, property
rights are assigned because it is the most efficient way to divide a limited
supply, whether it is signing a lease or buying books from the bookstore.
Ideas, on the other hand, are infinitely divisible and endlessly expressible.
Like the air we breathe, property rights are not necessary to prevent conges-
tion of ideas or the expressions thereof.196 This should be apparent from the
sheer volume of information that we produce every year, greater than our
predecessors ever dreamed and increasing exponentially every year.
If property rights in creative works are not morally justified, then they
must at least be justified by the economic argument that they both incentivize
the continued creation of works and satisfy consumer demand. However,
this is clearly not the case. In an economic analysis, one can infer market
power and the resulting inefficiency from profit margins. There are many
copyright-heavy companies that have seen enormous profit over the years,
but the market for textbooks is particularly instructive. Textbook authors
receive a double dose of revenue since typically, they are paid by their aca-
demic institution for the time spent writing the textbook and they also receive
royalties for its sale. While the market for textbooks is growing, the compe-
tition within each specific field of study is severely limited, usually compris-
ing just a few choices. Furthermore, publishers tightly control the supply of
192. Breyer, supra note 5, at 285 (citing Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law for House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (Comm. Print 1961)).
193. Breyer, supra note 5, at 283.
194. Breyer, supra note 5, at 286.
195. Breyer, supra note 5, at 286.
196. Breyer, supra note 5, at 289.
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textbooks and are quick to cause editions, just a few years old, to go out of
print in exchange for a new edition. Clearly the most efficient market solu-
tion, and the solution most favorable to the supposed goal of copyright-
increasing education by the dissemination of writings-would be to sell the
copyrights on older textbooks to second run publishers for sale in poorer
educational systems. However, because the copyright duration can easily
last over a century for new text books, there is no impetus to do so. Thus,
textbook publishers are able to take advantage of the copyright system to
their maximum benefit while schools, students, and the public are left hold-
ing the bag.
B. Advocating Copyright Extension for Private Gain
In view of the failure of the moral and economic arguments, it is diffi-
cult to remain stoic amid the seemingly blind adherence to a very old system.
Without empirical proof that copyright continues to benefit society, perhaps,
as Justice Breyer surmised, "the case for copyright ... rests not upon proven
need, but rather upon uncertainty as to what would happen if protection were
ever removed."197 Since the basic argument for copyright is weak, there
ought to be a heavy burden on those who seek to extend the duration of
copyright protection.198 As distinguished historian Baron Macauley advised
Parliament in 1841, copyright protection "ought not to last a day longer than
is necessary for the purpose of securing the good [of increased
production]. 199
However, despite the loud and consistent scholarly opinions that a
longer copyright term will not serve the goals of copyright, the period of
protection has slowly risen from its humble beginnings of fourteen years to
an average of almost a century. Such a long duration runs counter to almost
every conceivable rationale for how copyrighted works ordinarily are created
and managed in the real world. Only one book in a hundred is still in print
after fifty-six years. 200 Furthermore, with few exceptions, publishers base
their publication decision on whether the work will earn a net return within
only a few years.201 After the first several years of revenue stream, the only
purpose of a copyright is to drive in royalties through third parties licensing
the work. Yet, a vanishingly small percentage of copyrighted work is ever
197. Breyer, supra note 5, at 322.
198. Breyer, supra note 5, at 322-23.
199. Breyer, supra note 5, at 323 (citing Macaulay, Speeches on Copyright 23 (C.
Gaston ed. 1914)).
200. Breyer, supra note 5, at 324.
201. Breyer, supra note 5, at 325.
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licensed in the first place, and even for works that were once popular, the
chance of being licensed decreases into negligibility within a few decades.202
There are two reasons why copyright duration has steadily risen over the
years and will continue to do so unless decisive action is taken. First, due to
the essential group dynamics of a vocal minority, the owners of valuable
copyrights are able to organize and fund extraordinary lobbying efforts to
influence Congress in their favor. Most often these lobbying tactics, and the
subsequent bill proposals, are not well-publicized and are merely glossed
over by the public without an understanding for what is at stake. In fact, the
relatively recent passage of the CTEA was the first copyright extension act
that received real media attention, and it even passed through Congress with-
out any real debate on the justification for increasing the copyright term in
the first place. The majority, in this case the consuming public, is much
more difficult to educate and organize due to the low likelihood of realizing
substantial individual benefit from a policy change in their favor. These
large groups are much more likely to be plagued by apathy, ignorance, and
freeloaders. As law professors Kal Raustiala and Chris Sprigman noted,
"The result is that Congress hears, loudly and often, from those who favor
stronger protection [of copyrights]. Congress does not hear nearly as often
from those who take the opposite view."203 Even a comparatively large effort
to stop the CTEA, led by Dennis Karjala, was thwarted not on the issue itself,
but by the clever branding tactics of media conglomerates. By creating the
term "piracy" and labeling those that fight the rise of copyright law as sup-
porting piracy themselves, the copyright minority controls public perception
and swings the key votes in Congress towards their cause. 204
The second reason why copyright duration has risen, and will continue
to do so in the near future, is simpler to explain, but no less important: copy-
right holders have nothing to lose and everything to gain. For major media
companies such as Disney, Viacom, and Universal Studios-owners of some
of the most valuable copyrights in existence-there is an enormous incentive
to keep their copyrights out of the public domain for as long as possible.
Every year of continued ownership of valuable copyrights essentially
amounts to free money: while those copyrights continue making money, they
require no new work except the paperwork necessary to enforce the
copyright.
Even owners of less-famous copyrights have no incentive to allow their
work to ever go into the public domain. As long as there is still money to be
made from a copyright, the copyright owner's sole interest lies in extending
202. Since the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, virtually every expression of
an idea is copyrighted from the moment it is created, without requiring notice.
203. Mike Masnick, If Fashion Copyright Harms So Many, Why Is Congress Push-
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the copyright protection for as long as possible. Indeed, many artists, such as
the late Sonny Bono, have lobbied for far longer copyright protection.
Bono's wife, Congresswoman Mary Bono Mack, suggested a right to copy-
right protection lasting "forever minus a day" in order to circumvent the
Constitutional prohibition on perpetual intellectual property rights.205 Al-
though the CTEA only extended the copyright duration on preexisting copy-
rights for about twenty years, Bono may have gotten his wish after all by
helping set a precedent that allows Congress to legally increase the copyright
term every time the oldest copyrights are set to expire. The hard truth of the
matter is that no works copyrighted after 1923 have yet entered the public
domain.206 Furthermore, there is a very real chance that the virtually worth-
less public domain may never be replenished with new material. Like clock-
work, every twenty years when the same "generation" of valuable copyrights
is getting ready to expire, lobbyists convince Congress to pass a new bill
extending copyright duration yet again. According to this schedule, we
should see a new proposal for copyright extension before 2018.
C. Why the Public Domain Matters
Of course, Big Media cannot be considered morally at fault for success-
fully extending U.S. copyright duration multiple times. At the end of the
day, it is simply individuals trying to maximize their career by making more
money for their company. However, by extending the copyright duration for
every copyrightable work, Big Media and Congress have hamstrung the pub-
lic domain and handicapped the way the Internet can affect our lives. In fact,
with the combination of the CTEA and the more recent DMCA, the past
decade has amounted to "something of an intellectual land grab, presided
over by legislators and lawyers for the media industries."207
However, fearing that the continued strengthening of copyright in the
name of stopping "piracy" will have disastrous consequences for society, a
protest movement known as the Copy Left is gathering strength208 The
Copy Left movement, joined by scholars and activists around the country,
sees the public domain as a worthwhile prize. Professor James Boyle views
the public domain as a necessity for social and cultural progress as opposed
to a socialist luxury. He remarks that, "our art, our culture, our science de-
pend on this public domain every bit as much as they depend on intellectual
205. Dennis Karjala, Value of the Public Domain, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., at httph://
homepages.law.asu.edu/-dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/publicdomain.
html.
206. Copyrighted works created in 1923 and later will begin to enter the public
domain on Jan. 1, 2019. See, e.g., Circular 15t: Extension of Copyright Terms
3 at http://www.pdinfo.com/pdf/circ l5t.pdf.
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property."209 Central to the Copy Left's purpose is the salvation of the In-
ternet, which they view as far from achieving its true potential. The Internet
has been enormously successful as a tool for interacting with media and re-
engaging with culture. Through the power of the Internet, we are able to
shed the "broadcasting model" of passively absorbing the programs Big Me-
dia puts in front of us. 21 0 However, it should come as no surprise that as we
enter an unprecedented digital era without a renewing public domain-and
unprecedented access to creative works-we should see a dramatic increase
in litigation, fees, and strife.
Lawrence Lessig, a professor at Stanford Law School and counsel for
the plaintiff in Eldred v. Ashcroft, is attempting to change all of this.211 Les-
sig is responsible for a movement taking place on the Internet called the
Creative Commons, which allows artists to use a different, less-restrictive
method of protection separate from copyright law. Using the Creative Com-
mons, the artist has the power to specify exactly what level of permission the
public has to use his work.212 While there is room for improvement, the
Creative Commons has been a resounding success both as a standalone copy-
right system and a social experiment. However, it cannot replace copyright
law; meaningful change can only occur when Congress takes a step in a new
direction.
D. The Futility and Injustice of Existing Copyright Law
Although the Google cases may seem to represent a success for the
Copy Left, this view is deceptive. At this point, it would be more accurate to
say that Google has certain unique standards applied to it, while the rest of
tie alleged "pirates" have much harsher standards. This is due, at least in
part, to the vast resources that Google has at its disposal to defend itself
against infringement cases, but it is also a symptom of the courts' inability to
find justice for the individual in the midst of the movers and shakers of the
copyright world.
However, even Google is facing a costly legal battle in the form of its
Google Books project, which aspires to collect all the world's books into one
reference source, somewhat like a library index system with a preview op-
tion. The Authors Guild and major members of the Association of American
Publishers are attempting to quash Google's project by arguing that it does
not constitute a fair use.213 This would seem to be a highly analogous situa-




212. CREATIVE COMMONS "FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS," http:/I
wiki.creativecommons.org/FAQ#What areCreativeCommonslicenses.
213. Complaint at 2-3, Author's Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-cv-8136 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 20, 2005).
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Google Books works identically to how its general search engine works:
by combing through millions of books looking for matches in the search
terms, then giving you a sneak preview of the results. Theoretically, if a
court found that Google Books is a violation of copyright, then giving users a
sneak preview of copyrighted website content must be considered the exact
same type of violation. Indeed, some question whether Google should be
able to make billions of dollars merely by organizing other people's informa-
tion without sharing the profits with the copyright holders. This answer is
dependent on how the courts view Google's transformative use of the subject
matter, i.e., whether Google has added enough value to constitute a creative
work on its own.2 14
However, Google is just a single example of how the law of copyright is
currently in a large state of flux. Fundamental questions are being asked that
the public should already know the answer to if they are to avoid copyright
infringement. Based on the sheer amount of possible copyright infringement
that happens every day and goes on without a chance of being caught and
punished, it is clear that the law is not suited for the "crime." Furthermore, it
is not clear that copyright holders are actually being injured badly enough to
warrant such harsh penalties. The jury is still out on the extent to which the
average "pirate" harms the business of media conglomerates.215 However,
one thing that nobody can disguise is that despite any recent economic down-
turn, the members of Big Media still rank among America's wealthiest cor-
porations. In light of the massive difference in power between the average
consumer and Big Media-as well as the fact that Big Media practically
wrote recent copyright law themselves-it may be time to consider alterna-
tives to the existing system. Rather than attempting to continually patch up
the gaps in the current law with more and more statutes written for the sole
purpose of favoring the big guy over the little guy, perhaps it is time to
reevaluate where we stand relative to the fundamental goal of copyright law:
inspiring creativity and promoting education.
E. The Burdens of Free Speech
Copyright has the capacity to promote free speech. Although it is a
mechanism of government, copyright can spur creation by underwriting a
community of authors and publishers who are not beholden to the govern-
214. At the time of publication, Google is defending Google Books in lawsuits
around the world. In March 2011, a district court rejected a settlement offer
between Google and numerous publishing entities, claiming that the deal was
too expansive and would be unfair to copyright owners. See, e.g., Patricia
Hurtado & Don Jeffrey, Google, Publishers Seek More Time To Reach Book-
Scan Accord (June 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-01 /
google-publishers-discussing-options-for-book-scan-accord-lawyer-says.html.
215. Fundamentally, there is the question of whether an infringer would ever have
purchased or licensed the work if infringing had not been possible.
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ment for financial support.2 16 From the very beginning, copyright has been
tied to the ideas of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Supreme
Court has asserted that the First Amendment aspires to the "widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."217 In-
deed, the only reason copyright law is able to coexist with the rights prom-
ised by the First Amendment is because of its traditional free speech
guarantees of fair use, limited duration, and the idea that protection only
extends to the tangible form.2 1g
Copyright fulfilled this function well in the days when books were
among the only copyrightable works. It created order among the book pub-
lishing entities, preventing unfair competition from black market publishers
by sharply delineating and limiting the scope of copyright protection. At the
same time, the first Congress aimed to encourage audiences and subsequent
authors to freely incorporate existing works in any manner imaginable as
long as it was outside the owner's domain.219 However, as intellectual prop-
erty rights gradually became associated with conventional property rights and
media companies became larger and more influential, copyright shifted away
from its original purpose to favor copyright owners at the public's expense.
The ability to sample, critique, and supplement previous expressions is
an essential element of everyday life. Few authors or artists dare to claim
that they were not influenced or inspired by another's work. No man or
woman is an oasis of creativity, living in the wilderness apart from all human
contact. On the contrary, as a part of society we are constantly and irrevoca-
bly wrapped up in an infinitely complex series of stories and ideas upon
which everything we know is based. As copyright scholar Jack Balkin notes,
freedom of speech is our ability to "participate in culture through building on
what we find in culture and innovating with it, modifying it, and turning it to
our purposes."220 Copyright was intended to address where we draw the line
between legal and illegal usage. However, with the passing of each new law
that line has moved steadily into the hands of copyright owners. Under cur-
rent copyright law, an artist or user may be prevented from "effectively con-
veying a message, pursuing deeply held beliefs, expressing artistic
inspiration, participating in a cultural tradition, or even promoting the pro-
gress of science."221
The problem of the gradual shift of copyright towards the influence of
copyright owners is compounded by the nature of expression in the digital
age. The freedom granted by the pervasiveness of the Internet is a powerful
216. Netanel, supra note 4.
217. Netanel, supra note 4 at 6.
218. Netanel, supra note 4 at 6.
219. Netanel, supra note 4 at 6.
220. Netanel, supra note 4 at 43.
221. Netanel, supra note 4 at 13.
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tool, enabling a user to access an entire culture's worth of content with the
click of a mouse. It also offers the unrivaled ability to sample, remix, cri-
tique, and modify in order to create a new work and make a new statement.
It is merely a byproduct of society that the best way to get a message across
is often by appropriating a well-known pop culture reference-usually the
copyrighted content of mass media.
F. Balancing the Interests of U.S. Copyright Law
Ironically, an optimized solution for modern day copyright law is re-
markably similar to the system established by the Copyright Act of 1790.222
It involves going back to the core principles of the nature of copyright and a
more realistic balancing of interests between copyright owners, the public
and future authors. Upon application to the government by the artist or au-
thor, which could be done online, the creative work would be uploaded to a
government database and a copyright and corresponding identification num-
ber would be given out for each individual creative work. Much like the
current system used in managing patents, every copyrighted work in the
country could be constantly tracked and updated. This would take away
some of the mystery of having to constantly guess whether a work is copy-
righted or not-and greatly shorten the time consuming hunt for the copy-
right owner-by creating a reliable system of constructive notice. In this
way, it would also serve as a logical supplement to the function of the Li-
brary of Congress.
Copyright would be limited to works of a potentially digital nature, such
as pictures, novels, graphics, and other documents. Works which are too
"un-copyable" to submit for registration, such as statues, sculptures, fashion
designs, or other inherently non-digital works, would be denied copyright
registration and may not seek redress in the courts through copyright law.
However, tort law is still available for cases of misrepresentation of non-
copyrightable works.
The copyright duration would last for exactly ten years from either the
date of publication or the date of application, whichever is first. At the end
of this ten year period, the author would be free to renew the copyright for
another ten year term for a substantial fee. However, this right to renew
would be non-conveyable and could only be exercised by the actual living
author. Following this second term, all copyrights should be extinguished
and the work moves into the public domain. Thus, an artist is incentivized to
create, use, and license his work to the fullest extent during his lifetime and
during the twenty years of possible copyright protection if he so chooses, but
he is also free to abandon the work after ten years if it fails to make money.
Under the current copyright regime, which has withheld works from
ever entering the public domain by perpetually extending the copyright term,
222. COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1790, available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/
1790act.pdf (last visited March 31, 2012).
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it takes at least a century (if ever) for any work to enter the public domain.
This has stifled the creativity of the public, harmed the goals of education,
and contributed to an overly litigious copyright system. However, under a
copyright regime optimized for the fast-paced post-digital age, the public do-
main would be constantly refreshed by new and therefore still meaningful
material.
Similar to patent law, this new copyright system would emphasize an
intent to receive copyright protection. With an up-to-date database of all
copyrighted works-entirely funded by renewal fees-the public would have
instant access to information regarding who owns a copyrighted work and
when certain works will enter the public domain. Such a database would
benefit both copyright owners, who could easily be contacted by potential
licensees, and artists, who are able to avoid copyright infringement while
gaining access to an endlessly renewing public domain of work.
V. CONCLUSION
If copyright law is to remain a viable means of encouraging education
and creativity in the digital age, then changes in the law need to be made.
However, unlike past amendments to copyright law, these changes should
benefit society as whole and not merely copyright owners. Through case law
and ever expanding statutory law, artists have lost many of the freedoms of
creative expression that they once held. There are critical First Amendment
free speech concerns that must be addressed by Congress, particularly in the
realm of fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy. In a pattern we see
echoed every day, artists and users are going to create no matter what the law
says. The millions of alleged copyright infringements that occur every year
attest to the fact that the current law is simply unworkable. Thus, one impor-
tant step in fixing copyright law will be to create workable rules that can be
consistently enforced against violators while also serving free speech
considerations.
Furthermore, in refining the scope of copyright protection, it is also vital
that the duration of protection be optimized for the current Internet-driven
environment. Early thinkers such as Jefferson and Macauley were advocates
of the "not a day more than is necessary" school of thought, while owners of
valuable copyrights, such as Sonny Bono, tend to prefer extreme durations
lasting past their lifetimes and, preferably, "forever minus a day." It is not
surprising that copyright owners and the public tend to have markedly differ-
ent ideas for the ideal copyright duration. Due to a natural imbalance of
power between these two competing interests, a balanced government-run
solution is required.
Mark Twain is sometimes heralded as an early supporter for extended
copyright duration. He once famously stated:
My copyrights produce to me annually a good deal more money than I
have any use for. But those children of mine have use for that. I can take
care of myself as long as I live. I know half a dozen trades, and I can invent a
half a dozen more. I can get along. But I like the fifty years' extension,
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because that benefits my two daughters, who are not as competent to earn a
living as I am, because I have carefully raised them as young ladies, who
don't know anything and can't do anything. So I hope Congress will extend
to them that charity which they have failed to get from me.2 23
Although some people mistakenly take Twain seriously in this passage,
most people who read it, particularly after reading Twain's books, can sense
an air of playful irony in his words. He is mocking the copyright system for
completely exceeding the mark necessary to inspire creation and rewarding
artists' heirs with rights beyond all reason, thereby coddling them. Twain
saw, just as Justice Breyer does today, how unlikely it is for an artist to be
inspired to create by the prospect of a one-in-a-million shot of giving his
grandchildren money that they did not earn and will not deserve. Just as
there is no inherent injustice in an artist not receiving payment exceeding his
incentive cost, there is likewise no higher purpose served by giving non-artist
owners of copyrights-be they inheritors or copyright collectors-the benefit
of a work created by someone else.
The amount of media and the speed at which new media is produced is
increasing at an exponential rate, while the period of relevancy is decreasing.
In other words, culture is accelerating, just as it has for hundreds of years.
These facts, and the changes that they are sure to bring in the coming de-
cades, make the current duration of protection unreasonable, unenforceable,
unwieldy, and unrealistic. Furthermore, the currently bloated duration of
copyright protection is without a "moral leg" to stand on. Changes to copy-
right law are necessary and morally justifiable, and that change can begin
with a reevaluation of the term of copyright protection. In plotting the course
for how our children and grandchildren will interact with culture in the fu-
ture, it is vital that we look to the unbiased reasoning of the past for a realis-
tic and elegant solution for the present.
223. Ironically, the Mark Twain Foundation claims a copyright on Mark Twain's
recently published autobiography, released on the 100th anniversary of his
death. According to the law, the unpublished works of authors who died before
1940 are now public domain. Mike Masnick, Is Mark Twain's "New" Autobi-
ography Covered By Copyright? (Oct. 22, 2010), at http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20101022/01035811534/is-mark-twain-s-new-autobiography-covered-
by-copyright.shtml (last visited June 2, 2011).
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